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Improvement in Intrusion Detection with Advances
in Sensor Fusion
Ciza Thomas and N. Balakrishnan
Abstract—Various Intrusion Detection Systems reported in
literature have shown distinct preferences for detecting a certain
class of attack with improved accuracy, while performing mod-
erately on the other classes. In view of the enormous computing
power available in the present-day processors, deploying multiple
Intrusion Detection Systems in the same network to obtain
best-of-breed solutions has been attempted earlier. The paper
presented here addresses the problem of optimizing the perfor-
mance of Intrusion Detection Systems using sensor fusion with
multiple sensors. The trade-off between the detection rate and
false alarms with multiple sensors is highlighted. It is illustrated
that the performance of the detector is better when the fusion
threshold is determined according to the Chebyshev inequality.
In the proposed Data-dependent Decision fusion method, the
performance optimization of individual Intrusion Detection Sys-
tems is first addressed. A neural network supervised learner has
been designed to determine the weights of individual Intrusion
Detection Systems depending on their reliability in detecting a
certain attack. The final stage of this Data-dependent Decision
fusion architecture is a sensor fusion unit which does the weighted
aggregation in order to make an appropriate decision. This paper
theoretically models the fusion of Intrusion Detection Systems for
the purpose of demonstrating the improvement in performance,
supplemented with the empirical evaluation.
Index Terms—Intrusion Detection Systems; Sensor Fusion;
Neural Network; Data-dependent Decision Fusion; Chebyshev
Inequality.
I. INTRODUCTION
AN Intrusion Detection System (IDS) gathers informationfrom a computer or a network, and analyzes this informa-
tion to identify possible security breaches against the system
or the network. An observation of various IDSs available in
literature shows distinct preferences for detecting a certain
class of attack with improved accuracy, while performing
moderately on the other classes. The availability of enormous
computing power has made it possible for developing and
implementing IDSs of different types on the same network.
The integration of the decisions coming from different IDSs
has emerged as a technique that could strengthen the final deci-
sion. Sensor fusion can be defined as the process of collecting
information from multiple and possibly heterogeneous sources
and combining them to obtain a more descriptive, intuitive and
meaningful result [1].
Most of the related works [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], in the field
of sensor fusion have been carried out mainly with one of the
methods like probability theory, evidence theory, voting fusion
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theory, fuzzy logic theory or neural network, to aggregate
information. It is clear from all the previous works in sensor
fusion that there occur more effective means of analyzing the
information provided by existing IDSs, thereby causing an
effective data refinement for knowledge recovery. In spite of
all such attempts, the state-of-the-art IDS performance leaves
room for further improvement.
An analysis of the poorly detected attacks reveals the fact
that the attacks are characterized by features that do not
discriminate them much. An attempt to show the improved
performance of multiple IDSs using rule-based fusion has
been attempted in the work of Thomas and Balakrishnan [6].
The rule-based fusion systems work only with small input
data and there is the need for machine learning algorithms to
handle the type of data appearing on the network traffic. The
rule-based fusion also has the limitation of being dependent
on the individual IDSs that are used in sensor fusion. It
is necessary to incorporate an architecture that considers a
method of improving the detection rate by gathering an in-
depth understanding about the input traffic and also the behav-
ior of the individual IDSs. This helps in automatically learning
the individual weights for the combination when the IDSs
are heterogeneous and show difference in performance. The
architecture should thus be data-dependent and hence the rule
set has to be developed dynamically. A new Data-dependent
Decision(DD) fusion architecture underpinning sensor fusion
to significantly enhance the IDS performance is proposed in
the work of Thomas and Balakrishnan [7]. The improved
performance of the data-dependent decision fusion architecture
can be shown both theoretically as well as experimentally with
an approach adopted for optimizing both the local sensors and
the fusion unit with respect to the error rate. The optimal
performance along with the complexity of the task bring to
the fore the need for theoretically sound basis for the sensor
fusion techniques in IDSs.
The motivation of the present work was the fact that the
empirical evaluation as seen in [7] was extremely promis-
ing with the data-dependent decision fusion. The modeling
can be extremely useful with a complete addressing of the
problem with sound mathematical and logical concepts. Thus
the present work employs modeling to augment the effective
mathematical analysis of the improved performance of sensor
fusion and to develop a rational basis which is free from the
various techniques used.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows.
Section II discusses the related work of sensor fusion in
IDS. In section III, the model of the proposed data-dependent
decision fusion architecture is presented by modeling the
constituent parts and also by stating the problem. Algorithms
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for optimizing the local detectors along with a data-dependent
decision fusion architecture for optimizing the fusion criterion
are also presented in section III. Section IV contains the
experimental results along with the discussions regarding the
higher performance of the proposed architecture within the
threshold bounds and the trade-off between various network
parameters. Finally, the concluding comments are presented in
section V.
II. RELATED WORK
Tim Bass [2] presents a framework to improve the perfor-
mance of intrusion detection systems based on data fusion.
A few first steps towards developing the engineering require-
ments using the art and science of multi-sensor data fusion
as an underlying model is provided in [2]. Giacinto et al. [3]
propose an approach to intrusion detection based on fusion of
multiple classifiers. Didaci et al. [4] attempt the formulation
of the intrusion detection problem as a pattern recognition task
using data fusion approach based on multiple classifiers. Wang
et al. [5] present the superiority of data fusion technology
applied to intrusion detection systems. The use of data fusion
in the field of DoS anomaly detection is presented by Siaterlis
and Maglaris [1]. The detection engine is evaluated using the
real network traffic. Another work incorporating the Dempster-
Shafer theory of evidence is by Hu et al. [8].
Siraj et al. [9] discuss a Decision Engine for an Intelli-
gent Intrusion Detection System (IIDS) that fuses information
from different intrusion detection sensors using an artificial
intelligence technique. Thomopolous in one of his work [10],
concludes that with the individual sensors being independent,
the optimal decision scheme that maximizes the probability
of detection at the fusion for fixed false alarm probability
consists of a Neyman-Pearson test at the fusion unit and the
likelihood ratio test at the sensors. The threshold based fusion
of combining multiple IDSs by fixing a certain number of false
alarms is discussed in the work of Thomas and Balakrishnan
[6]. This is a case of combining the top ranking outputs of
each IDS after removing the duplicate alerts and setting the
maximum acceptable false alarm rate.
The other somewhat related works albeit distantly are the
alarm clustering method by Perdisci et al. [11], aggregation
of alerts by Valdes et al. [12], combination of alerts into
scenarios by Dain et al. [13], the alert correlation by Cuppens
et al. [14], the correlation of Intrusion Symptoms with an
application of chronicles by Morin et al. [15], and aggregation
and correlation of intrusion-detection alerts by Debar et al.
[16].
In the paper by Thomas and Balakrishnan [7], a sensor
fusion architecture, which is data-dependent and different from
the conventional fusion architecture is attempted. The focus
of the present work is modeling the data-dependent decision
fusion in an attempt to optimize both the fusion rule as well
as the sensor rules.
III. MODELING THE DATA-DEPENDENT DECISION FUSION
SYSTEM
This work is an extension of the data-dependent decision
fusion approach proposed in our earlier work [7]. The paper
presented here includes modeling with optimization done at
every single stage, thereby arriving at an optimum architecture
showing improved performance than what has been reported
so far in literature. This architecture consists of three stages,
optimizing the individual IDSs as the first stage, determining
the weights of the individual IDSs with a neural network
learner as the second stage, and performing the weighted
aggregation with a fusion unit as the final stage.
A. Modeling the Intrusion Detection Systems
Consider an IDS that either monitors the network traffic
connection on the network or the audit trails on the host. The
network traffic connection or the audit trails monitored are
given as x ∈ X , where X is the entire domain of network
traffic features or the audit trails respectively. The model is
based on the hypothesis that the security violations can be
detected by monitoring the network for traffic connections
of malicious intent in the case of network-based IDS and a
system’s audit records for abnormal patterns of system usage
in the case of host-based IDS. The model is independent of any
particular operating system, application, system vulnerability
or type of intrusion, thereby providing a framework for a
general-purpose IDS.
When making an attack detection, a connection pattern is
given by xj ∈ <jk where j is the number of features from
k consecutive samples used as input to an IDS. As seen in
the DARPA dataset, for many of the features the distributions
are difficult to describe parametrically as they may be
multi-modal or very heavy-tailed. These highly non-Gaussian
distributions has led to investigate non-parametric statistical
tests as a method of intrusion detection in the initial phase
of IDS development. The detection of an attack in the event
x is observed as an alert. In the case of network-based IDS,
the elements of x can be the fields of the network traffic like
the raw IP packets or the pre-processed basic attributes like
the duration of a connection, the protocol type, service etc.
or specific attributes selected with domain knowledge such as
the number of failed logins or whether a superuser command
was attempted. In host-based IDS, x can be the sequence
of system calls, sequence of user commands, connection
attempts to local host, proportion of accesses in terms of TCP
or UDP packets to a given port of a machine over a fixed
period of time etc. Thus IDS can be defined as a function
that maps the data input into a normal or an attack event
either by means of absence of an alert (0) or by the presence
of an alert (1) respectively and is given by:
IDS : X → {0, 1}.
To detect attacks in the incoming traffic, the IDSs are
typically parameterized by a threshold T. The IDS uses a
theoretical basis for deciding the thresholds for analyzing the
network traffic to detect intrusions. Changing this threshold
allows the change in performance of the IDS. If the threshold
is very low, then the IDS tends to be very aggressive in
detecting the traffic for intrusions. However, there is a
potentially greater chance for the detections to be irrelevant
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which result in large false alarms. A large value of threshold
on the other hand will have an opposite effect; being a bit
conservative in detecting attacks. However, some potential
attacks may get missed this way. Using a 3σ based statistical
analysis, the higher threshold (Th) is set at +3σ and the lower
threshold (Tl) is set at −3σ. This is with the assumption
that the traffic signals are normally distributed. In general
the traffic detection with s being the sensor output is given by:
Sensor Detection =
{
attack, Tl < s < Th
normal, s ≤ Tl, s ≥ Th
The signature-based IDS functions by looking at the event
feature x and checking whether it matches with any of the
records in the signature database D.
Signature-based IDS : X → {1} ∀x ∈ D,
: X → {0} ∀x /∈ D.
Anomaly-based IDS generates alarm when the input
traffic deviates from the established models or profiles P .
Anomaly-based IDS : X → {1} ∀x /∈ P,
: X → {0} ∀x ∈ P.
B. Modeling the fusion IDS
Consider the case where n IDSs monitor a network for
attack detection and each IDS makes a local decision si and
these decisions are aggregated in the fusion unit f . This
architecture is often referred to as the parallel decision fusion
network and is shown in Figure 1. The fusion unit makes
a global decision, y, about the true state of the hypothesis
based on the collection of the local decisions gathered from
all the sensors. The problem is casted as a binary detection
IDS2
IDS1
INPUT .
.
.
.
.
IDSn
FUSION UNIT
OUTPUT (y)(x)
S1
S2
Sn
Fig. 1. Parallel Decision Fusion Network
problem with the hypothesis “Attack” or “Normal”.
Every IDS participating in the fusion has its own detection
rate Di, and false positive rate Fi, due to the preferred
heterogeneity of the sensors in the fusion process. Each IDS
indexed i gives an alert or no-alert indicated by si taking a
value one or zero respectively, depending on the observation x.
si =
{
0, normal is declared to have been detected
1, attack is declared to have been detected
The fusion center collects these local decisions si and forms
a binomial distribution y as given by y=s =
n∑
i=1
si, where
n is the total number of IDSs taking part in fusion.
Theorem 1
The output of a binary fusion unit is decided by a function
f given by:
f : s1 x s2..... x sn x x ⇒ {0, 1}, where the decisions of
the individual detectors given by si are deterministic and the
data x is a random parameter.
Lemma 1
The decision rule used by each of the individual detectors
is deterministic and can be expressed as a function fi given by:
fi : si ⇒ {0, 1} defined as:
fi(xj) =
{
0, if p(sji = 0|xj) = 1
1, otherwise
where j corresponds to the class of the network traffic
on which the fusion rule as well as the respective sensor
outputs depend. Since fusion center makes the final decision,
the assumption is made that the output of the fusion rule is
binary, i.e., either Normal or Attack. It is the same case
with all the individual IDSs: each IDS classifies the incoming
traffic as Normal or Attack.
C. Statement of the problem
The problem statement is defined in the following steps:
• The random variable x represents the observation to be
made. This observation belongs to either of the two
groups of the hypothesis: Normal or Attack with prob-
abilities p or q = 1− p, respectively.
• A set of n IDSs monitors the random variable x and
detects the presence of attack in the traffic. The set of
detections by the n sensors is given by {s1, s2.....sn},
where si is the output of the IDS indexed i. Each si is a
function of the input x, i.e., si = fi(x).
• The problem of optimum detection with n IDSs selecting
either of the two possible hypotheses is considered from
the decision theory point of view. The loss function `
is defined in terms of the decisions made by each IDS
along with the observation and is given by:
` : {0, 1} x {0, 1} x .....{0, 1} x {Normal,Attack} ⇒
R. Then the average of this loss is minimized. The
objective of the decision strategy is to minimize the
expected penalty (loss function) incurred as:
min E[`(s1, s2.....sn,H)], (1)
where H is the hypothesis and the minimization is
over the decision rules of each detector.
• With `(s1, s2.....sn,H) = k being the cost incurred
for the IDS1 deciding s1, IDS2 deciding s2, and so
on. The minimum value of this cost function ` occurs
when all the sensors make the correct decisions as
`(0, 0, ...0, Normal) = `(1, 1, ...1, Attack) = 0 and
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increases to “1” if any one IDS only is incorrect and
so on. Thus the cost function ` takes the maximum value
of “n” when all the IDSs are unable to make the correct
decision. This is a trivial case where all cases of n errors
is penalized by the same amount and the function ` can
be reduced by using affine transformations. From the cost
matrix of the KDD IDS evaluations [20], it is clear that
`(0, s1, s2.....sn, Attack) > `(1, s1, s2.....sn, Normal),
or it is more costly for any detector to miss an attack
compared to a false alarm, regardless of the detection of
other detectors. The minimization of the loss leads to sets
of coupled inequalities in terms of the likelihood ratio of
each IDS and the decisions made at the other sensors.
• As k decreases from 2 to 1, the thresholds would
change in a way which increases the probability of error,
as double errors are discounted to single ones. As k
increases from 2, double errors become prohibitively
expensive, so it is to be expected that some mechanism
will emerge to reduce their likelihood. Thus, for k
varying from 1 to n, there are n solutions to minimize
equation 1, one of which being the global minimum and
thus the optimal threshold pair.
D. The effect of setting threshold
To detect the attack in the incoming traffic, the IDSs are
typically parameterized with a threshold, T. Changing this
threshold allows the change in performance of the IDS. If the
threshold is very large, some potentially dangerous attacks get
missed. A small threshold on the other hand results in more
detections, with a potentially greater chance that they are not
relevant.
The final step in the approach towards solving of the fusion
problem is taken by noticing that the decision function fi(.)
is characterized by the threshold Ti and the likelihood ratio (if
independence is assumed). Thus the necessary condition for
optimal fusion decision occurs if the thresholds (T1, T2, ...Tn)
are chosen optimally. However, this does not satisfy the
sufficient condition. These refer to the many local minima,
each need to be checked to assure the global minimum.
The counterintuitive results at the individual sensors with
the proper choice of thresholds will be advantageous in getting
an optimum value for the fusion result. They are excellent
paradigms for studying distributed decision architectures, to
understand the impact of the limitations, and even suggest
empirical experiments for IDS decisions.
The structure of the fusion rule plays a crucial role regarding
the overall performance of the IDS since the fusion unit
makes the final decision about the state of the environment.
While a few inferior IDSs might not greatly impact the overall
performance, a badly designed fusion rule can lead to a poor
performance even if the local IDSs are well designed. The
fusion IDS can be optimized by searching the space of fusion
rules and optimizing the local thresholds for each candidate
rule. Other than for some simple cases, the complexity of
such an approach is prohibitive due to exponential growth of
the set of possible fusion rules with respect to the number of
IDSs. Searching for the fusion rule that leads to the minimum
probability of error is the main bottleneck due to discrete
nature of this optimization process and the exponentially large
number of fusion rules. In our experiment we are trying to
maximize the true positive rate by fixing the false positive
rate at α0. α0 determines the threshold T by trial and error.
We have noticed that within two or three trials in our case.
This is done with the training data and hence it is done off
line.
The computation of thresholds couples the choice of the
local decision rules so that the system-wide performance is
optimized, rather than the performance of the individual de-
tector. This requirement is taken care of by the data-dependent
decision fusion architecture in [7] and shown in Figure 2.
This architecture has three-stages; the IDSs that produce the
IDS1 IDSn
INPUT (x)
OUTPUT(y)
FUSION UNIT
NEURAL NETWORK LEARNERx
IDS2
S1 S2 Sn
S1 S2 Sn
S1
S2
Sn
w1
w2
wn
Fig. 2. Data-dependent Decision Fusion architecture
alerts as the first stage, the neural network supervised learner
determining the weights to the IDSs’ decisions depending on
the input as the second stage, and then the fusion unit doing
the weighted aggregation. The neural network learner can be
considered as a pre-processing stage to the fusion unit. The
neural network is most appropriate for weight determination,
since it becomes difficult to define the rules clearly, mainly
as more number of IDSs are added to the fusion unit. When
a record is correctly classified by one or more detectors, the
neural network will accumulate this knowledge as a weight
and with more number of iterations, the weight gets stabilized.
This information is used to fine-tune the fusion unit, since the
fusion depends on the input feature vector. The fusion output
is represented as:
y = Fj(w
j
i (xj , s
j
i ), s
j
i ),
where the weights wji are dependent on both the input xj as
well as individual IDS’s output sji , where the prefix j refers to
the class label and the suffix i refers to the IDS index. The fu-
sion unit used gives a value of “1” or “0” depending on the set
threshold being higher or lower than the weighted aggregation
of the IDS’s decisions. The fusion unit is optimized using this
set up with the proper weighting to each one of the input to the
fusion unit. The individual IDS are optimized by the proper
choice of the threshold which is decided by the detection-
false alarm trade-off. ROC curves are used to evaluate IDS
performance over a range of trade-offs between detection rate
and the false positive rate. Each IDS will have an operating
point in the ROC curve and the optimum operating point is
located at the relatively top-left point. The optimal decision
fusion detection rule is obtained by forming the output of
the fusion unit as: y = s =
n∑
i=1
wji s
j
i . The architecture is
independent of the data set and the structures employed, and
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can be used with any real valued data set.
E. Modeling the Neural Network learner unit
The neural network unit in the data-dependent architecture
is a supervised learning system which learns from a training
data set. The training of the neural network unit by back prop-
agation involves three stages: the feed forward of the output
of all the IDSs along with the input training pattern, which
collectively form the training pattern for the neural network
learner unit, the calculation and the back propagation of the
associated error, and the adjustments of the weights. After the
training, the neural network is used for the computations of
the feedforward phase. Learning can be defined over an input
space X , an output space Y and a loss function `. The training
data can be specified as {(xi, yi)}, where xi ∈ X and yi ∈ Y .
The output is a hypothesis function fw : X → Y . fw is chosen
from a hypothesis space F to minimize the prediction error
given by the loss function. The hypothesis function is that of
the neural network and it represents the non-linear function
from the input space X to the output space Y .
It is simple to assume stationarity by assuming the distribu-
tion of data points encountered in the future to be the same as
the distribution of the training set. For simplicity, the DARPA
data set is assumed to represent the real time traffic pattern
distribution. Stationarity allows us to reduce the predictive
learning problem to a minimization of the sum of the loss
over the training set.
f∗w = argmin
∑
`(fw(xi), yi)
s.t fw ∈ F & (xi, yi) ∈ s. (2)
Loss functions are typically defined to be non-negative over
all inputs and zero when fw(xi) = yi.
F. Dependence on the data and the individual IDSs
Often, the data in the databases is only an approximation
of the true data. When the information about the goodness
of the approximation is recorded, the results obtained from
the database can be interpreted more reliably. Any database is
associated with a degree of accuracy, which is denoted with a
probability density function, whose mean is the value itself.
In order to maximize the detection rate it is necessary to
fix the false alarm rate to an acceptable value, taking into
account the trade-off between the detection rate and the false
alarm rate. The threshold (T ) that maximizes the TPrate and
thus minimizes the FNrate is given as:
FPrate = P [alert|normal]
= P
[
n∑
i=1
wisi ≥ T |normal
]
= α0, (3)
TPrate = P [alert|attack]
= P
[
n∑
i=1
wisi ≥ T |attack
]
. (4)
The fusion of IDSs becomes meaningful only when FP ≤
FPi ∀ i and TP ≥ TPi ∀ i; where FP and TP
correspond to the false positives and the true positives of the
fused IDS and FPi and TPi correspond to the false positives
and the true positives of the individual IDS indexed i. It is
required to provide low value of weight to any individual
sensor that is unreliable, hence meeting the constraint on false
alarm as given in equation 3. Similarly, the fusion improves
the TPrate as the detectors get weighted according to their
performance.
G. Threshold Optimization
Tenney and Sandell in their work [19] establish the optimum
strategy that minimizes a global cost in the case where
the a priori probabilities of the hypotheses, the distribution
functions of the local observations, the cost functions, and the
fusion rule are given. They concluded that each local detector
is optimally a likelihood ratio detector but that the compu-
tation of the optimum thresholds for these local detectors is
complicated due to cross coupling.
The global optimization criterion for a distributed detection
system would encompass local decision statistics, local deci-
sion thresholds, the fusion center decision statistic, and the
fusion center decision threshold.
For each input traffic observation x, the set of n local
thresholds should be optimized with respect to the probability
of error. With a fusion rule given by a function f , the average
probability of error at the fusion unit is given by the weighted
sum of false positive and false negative errors.
Pe(T, f) = p∗P (s = 1|Normal)+ q∗P (s = 0|Attack), (5)
where p and q are the respective weights of false positive
and false negative errors.
Assuming independence between the local detectors, the
likelihood ratio is given by:
P (s|Attack)
P (s|Normal) =
P (s1, s2, ..., sN |Attack)
P (s1, s2, ..., sN |Normal)
=
n∏
i=1
P (si|Attack)
P (si|Normal) .
The optimum decision rule for the fusion unit follows:
f(s) = log
P (s|Attack)
P (s|Normal)
Depending on the value of f(s) being greater than or
equal to the decision threshold, T , or less than the decision
threshold, T , the decision is made for the hypothesis as
“Attack” or “Normal” respectively. Thus the decisions
from the n detectors are coupled through a cost function. It is
shown that the optimal decision is characterized by thresholds
as in the decoupled case. As far as the optimum criterion is
concerned, the first step is to minimize the loss function of
equation 1. This leads to sets of simultaneous inequalities in
terms of the generalized likelihood ratios at each detector,
the solutions of which determine the regions of optimum
detection.
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H. Fixing threshold bounds at the fusion unit
Instead of using a fixed threshold to determine the intrusion,
the problem can be solved by using more flexible bounds and
adjusting the bounds for optimum detection-false alarm trade-
off taking into account the stochastic nature of network traffic.
Let D and F denote the unanimous detection rate and the
false positive rate respectively. The mean and the variance
of the traffic patterns can be used to compute the probability
of anomaly assuming the normal distribution. This refers to
the amount of anomalous traffic quantitatively. The mean and
variance of s in case of attack and no-attack, are given by
the following equations:
E[s|alert] =
n∑
i=1
Di, V ar[s|alert] =
n∑
i=1
Di(1−Di);
in case of attack,
E[s|alert] =
n∑
i=1
Fi, V ar[s|alert] =
n∑
i=1
Fi(1− Fi);
in case of no-attack.
The fusion IDS is required to give a high detection
rate and a low false positive rate. Hence the threshold T
needs to be chosen well above the mean of the false alerts
and well below the mean of the true alerts. Consequently, the
threshold bounds are given as:
n∑
i=1
Fi < T <
n∑
i=1
Di.
The detection rate and the false positive rate of the
fusion IDS is desired to surpass the corresponding weighted
averages and hence:
D >
n∑
i=1
D2i
n∑
i=1
Di
(6)
and
F <
n∑
i=1
(1− Fi)Fi
n∑
i=1
(1− Fi)
. (7)
Now, using simple range comparison,
D = P{s ≥ T |attack}
= P
{
|s−
n∑
i=1
Di| ≤
(
n∑
i=1
Di − T
)
|attack
}
.
With the mean and variance known, a new observation is
defined to be abnormal if it falls outside a confidence interval
that is dependent on the standard deviation. This modeling
requires no prior knowledge about normal activity in order
to set the limits; instead, it learns what constitutes normal
activity from its observations, and the confidence intervals
automatically reflect this increased knowledge. Also, the
confidence interval depends on the observed data. Using the
Chebyshev inequality on the random variable s with
mean = E[s] =
n∑
i=1
Di and
variance = V ar[s]=
n∑
i=1
Di(1−Di),
P {|s− E(s)| ≥ k} ≤ V ar(s)k2
With the assumption that the threshold T is greater
than the mean of normal activity,
P
{
|s−
n∑
i=1
Di| ≤
(
n∑
i=1
Di − T
)
|attack
}
≥
1 −
n∑
i=1
Di(1−Di)(
n∑
i=1
Di−T
)2
From (6) it follows that :
1 −
n∑
i=1
Di(1−Di)(
n∑
i=1
Di−T
)2 ≥
n∑
i=1
D2i
n∑
i=1
Di
The upper bound of T is derived from the above equation as:
T ≤
n∑
i=1
Di −
√√√√ n∑
i=1
Di
Similarly, for the false positive rate, F = P{s ≥ T |no-
attack}, in order to derive the lower bound of T ,
From (7) it follows that :
n∑
i=1
Fi(1− Fi)(
T −
n∑
i=1
Fi
)2 ≤
n∑
i=1
Fi(1− Fi)
n∑
i=1
(1− Fi)
The lower bound of T is derived from the above equation as:
T ≥
n∑
i=1
Fi +
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(1− Fi)
The threshold bounds for the fusion IDS is: n∑Fi
i = 1
+
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(1− Fi)
,
n∑
i=1
Di −
√√√√ n∑
i=1
Di
.
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It is necessary to have the minimum required number
of IDSs in the fusion architecture so that the bound exists,
i.e., the upper bound is ensured to be larger than the lower
bound as:
n∑
i=1
Di −
√√√√ n∑
i=1
Di ≥
n∑
i=1
Fi +
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(1− Fi)
This condition poses a restriction on the individual detection
rates, individual false alarm rates and the number of individual
IDSs used in the fusion process.
Since the threshold T is assumed to be greater than the
mean of normal activity, the upper bound of false positive
rate F can be obtained from the Chebyshev inequality as:
F ≤ V ar[s]
(T − E[s])2 (8)
In order to reduce the false positive rate, it is important to
reduce the variance of the normal traffic. In the ideal case
with normal traffic the variance is zero. From equation 8 it can
be seen that as the variance of the normal traffic approaches
zero, the false positive rate also approaches zero. Also, since
the threshold T is assumed to be less than the mean of the
intrusive activity, the lower bound of the detection rate D can
be obtained from the Chebyshev inequality as:
D ≥ 1− V ar[s]
(E[s]− T )2 (9)
For an intrusive traffic, the factor Di(1 − Di) remains
almost steady and hence the value of Variance
=
n∑
i=1
Di(1−Di) is an appreciable value. Since the variance
of the attack traffic is above a certain detectable minimum,
from equation 9 it is seen that the correct detection rate
can approach an appreciably high value. Similarly the true
negatives will also approach a high value since the false
positive rate is reduced with IDS fusion.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Test set up
The test set up for the experimental evaluation consisted of
three Pentium machines with Linux operating system. For a
good protection, a combination of shallow and deep sensors
is necessary in many systems. Hence, for the purpose of
fusion we have incorporated two sensors, one that monitors
the header of the traffic packet and the other that monitors
the packet content. The experiments were conducted with
the simulated IDSs PHAD and ALAD [21]. This choice of
heterogeneous sensors in terms of their functionality is to
exploit the advantages of fusion IDS [2]. In addition, com-
plementary IDSs provide versatility and similar IDSs ensure
reliability. The PHAD being packet-header based and detecting
one packet at a time, is totally unable to detect the slow
scans. However, PHAD detects the stealthy scans much more
effectively. The ALAD being content-based will complement
the PHAD by detecting R2L(Remote to Local) and U2R(User
to Root) attacks with appreciable efficiency.
The weight analysis of the IDS data coming from PHAD
and ALAD was carried out by the neural network supervised
learner before it was fed to the fusion element. The detectors
PHAD and ALAD produces the IP address along with the
anomaly score of the alert. The alerts produced by these
IDSs are converted to a standard binary form. The neural
network learner inputs these decisions along with the particular
traffic input which was monitored by the IDSs. The Internet
Engineering Task Force Intrusion Detection working group’s
Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF),
which enable different types of IDSs to generate the events
by using unified language can be used instead.
The neural network learner was designed as a feed forward
back propagation algorithm with a single hidden layer and 25
sigmoidal hidden units in the hidden layer. Experimental proof
is available for the best performance of the Neural Network
with the number of hidden units being log(T ), where T is
the number of training samples in the data set [22]. In order
to train the neural network, it is necessary to expose them to
both normal and anomalous data. Hence, during the training,
the network was exposed to weeks 1, 2, and 3 of the training
data and the weights were adjusted using the back propagation
algorithm. An epoch of training consisted of one pass over
the training data. The training proceeded until the total error
made during each epoch stopped decreasing or 1000 epochs
had been reached.
The fusion element analyzes the IDS data coming from
PHAD and ALAD distributed across the single subnet and
observing the same domain. The fusion unit performed the
weighted aggregation of the IDS outputs for the purpose of
identifying the attacks in the test data set. It used binary
fusion by giving an output value of one or zero depending
on the value of the weighted aggregation of the various IDS
decisions. The packets were identified by their timestamp on
aggregation. A value of one at the output of the fusion unit
indicated the record to be under attack and a zero indicated
the absence of an attack.
B. Data set
The MIT Lincoln Laboratory under DARPA and AFRL
sponsorship, has collected and distributed the first standard
corpora for evaluation of computer network intrusion detection
systems. The network traffic including the entire payload of
each packet was recorded in tcpdump format and provided
for evaluation. This MIT-DARPA data set (IDEVAL 1999)
[23] was used to train and test the performance of Intrusion
Detection Systems. The data for the weeks one and three were
used for the training of the anomaly detectors and the weeks
four and five were used as the test data. The training of the
neural network learner was performed on the training data
for weeks one, two and three, after the individual IDSs were
trained. Each of the IDS was trained on distinct portions of
the training data (ALAD on week one and PHAD on week
three), which is expected to provide independence among the
IDSs and also to develop diversity while being trained.
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It is important to mention at this point that the proposed
architecture can be generalized beyond the data set or the
IDSs that are used in fusion. Even with the criticisms by
McHugh [24] and Mahoney and Chan [25] against the DARPA
dataset, the dataset was extremely useful in the IDS evaluation
undertaken in this work. Since none of the IDSs perform
exceptionally well on the DARPA dataset, the aim is to show
that the performance improves with the proposed method. If
a system is evaluated on the DARPA dataset, then it cannot
claim anything more in terms of its performance on the real
network traffic. Hence this dataset can be considered as the
base line of any research [26]. Also, even after nine years of
its generation, there are still a lot of relevant attacks in the
data set for which signatures are not available in database of
even the frequently updated signature based IDSs.
C. Evaluation metrics
Let TP be the number of attacks that are correctly detected,
FN be the number of attacks that are not detected, TN
be the number of normal traffic packet/connections that are
correctly classified, and FP be the number of normal traffic
packet/connections that are incorrectly detected as attack. In
the case of an IDS, there are both the security requirements
and the usability requirements. The security requirement is
determined by the TPrate and the usability requirement is
decided by the number of FPs because of the low base rate
in the case of a network traffic.
The commonly used IDS evaluation metrics on a test data
are the overall accuracy and F-score.
Overall Accuracy = TP+TNTP+FP+TN+FN
Overall Accuracy is not a good metric for comparison
in the case of network traffic data since the true negatives
abound.
Precision is a measure of what fraction of test data
detected as attack are actually from the attack classes.
Precision = TPTP+FP
Recall is a measure of what fraction of attack class
was correctly detected.
Recall = TPTP+FN
There is a trade-off between the two metrics precision
and recall. As the number of detections increase by lowering
of the threshold, the recall will increase, while precision is
expected to decrease. The recall-precision characterization of
a particular IDS is normally used to analyze the relative and
absolute performance of an IDS over a range of operating
conditions. F-score, which is the harmonic mean of recall(R)
and precision(P), scores the balance between precision and
recall. The F-score is given by:
F -score = 2∗P∗RP+R
The standard measures, namely precision, recall, and F-
score are grounded on a probabilistic framework and hence
allows one to take into account the intrinsic variability of
performance estimation. The comparison of IDSs with the
metric F-score has the limitation in directly applying tests
of significance to it in order to determine the confidence
level of the comparison. The primary goal was to achieve
improvement in recall as well as precision, and hence P-test
[27] is used which account for the improvement in both
precision and recall.
To compare two IDS X and Y, let (RX , PX) and (RY , PY )
be the values of recall and precision w.r.t attack respectively.
Let IDS X and Y predict NPosX and N
Pos
Y positives
respectively and NPos be the total number of positives in the
test sample. Then the P-test is applied as follows:
ZR = RX−RY√
2R(1−R)/NPos
ZP = PX−PY√
2P (1−P )(1/NPos
X
+1/NPos
Y
)
where R = RX+RY2 and P =
NPosX PX+N
Pos
Y PY
NPos
X
+NPos
Y
If ZR ≥ 1.96, then RX can be regarded as being significantly
better than RY at the 95% confidence level.
If ZR ≤ −1.96, then RX can be regarded as being
significantly poorer than RY at the 95% confidence level.
If |ZR| ≤ 1.96, then RX can be regarded as being
comparable to RY .
Similar tests are applied to compare PX and PY .
Now, to compare the two IDSs X and Y ;
IDS X is better than IDS Y if either of the following criteria
is satisfied:
RX À RY and PX ∼ PY
RX À RY and PX À PY
RX ∼ RY and PX À PY
RX ∼ RY and PX ∼ PY , then X ∼ Y .
It may so happen that one metric is significantly better
and the other metric is significantly worse. In such cases
of conflict, the non-probabilistic metric F-score can be used
instead of applying the significance test.
D. Experimental evaluation
All the IDSs that form part of the fusion IDS were
first evaluated separately with the same data set, and then
the combined fusion IDS was evaluated. The experimental
results of Table I and Table II clearly show that none of the
individual IDS was able to provide an acceptable value for
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• TABLE I
ATTACKS OF EACH TYPE DETECTED BY PHAD AT 0.00002 FP RATE
Attack type Total attacks Attacks detected % detection
Probe 37 26 70%
DoS 63 27 43%
R2L 53 6 11%
U2R/Data 37 4 11%
Total 190 63 33%
TABLE II
ATTACKS OF EACH TYPE DETECTED BY ALAD AT 0.00002 FP RATE
Attack type Total attacks Attacks detected % detection
Probe 37 9 24%
DoS 63 23 37%
R2L 53 31 59%
U2R/Data 37 15 41%
Total 190 78 41%
all the performance measures.
The analysis of PHAD and ALAD have resulted in a clear
understanding of the individual IDSs expected to succeed or
fail under a particular attack. The combination of the two
sensor alerts provide an improved rate of detection as shown
in Table III.
In each of the individual IDSs, the number of detections were
observed at false positives of 50, 100, 200 and 500, when
trained on inside week 1 and week 3 along with additional
normal traffic collected from our University traffic, and tested
on weeks 4 and 5.
The performance in terms of F-score of PHAD, ALAD and
TABLE III
ATTACKS OF EACH TYPE DETECTED BY FUSION IDS AT 0.00004 FP RATE
Attack type Total attacks Attacks detected % detection
Probe 37 30 81%
DOS 63 42 67%
R2L 53 32 60%
U2R/Data 37 18 49%
Total 190 122 64%
TABLE IV
F-SCORE AND OVERALL ACCURACY FOR DIFFERENT CHOICE OF FALSE
POSITIVES FOR PHAD
FP TP Precision Recall Overall Accuracy F-score
50 40 0.44 0.21 0.99 0.28
100 63 0.39 0.33 0.99 0.36
200 63 0.24 0.33 0.99 0.28
500 63 0.11 0.33 0.99 0.17
TABLE V
F-SCORE AND OVERALL ACCURACY FOR DIFFERENT CHOICE OF FALSE
POSITIVES FOR ALAD
FP TP Precision Recall Overall Accuracy F-score
50 52 0.29 0.27 0.99 0.28
100 78 0.44 0.41 0.99 0.42
200 86 0.30 0.45 0.99 0.36
500 90 0.15 0.47 0.99 0.23
TABLE VI
F-SCORE AND OVERALL ACCURACY FOR DIFFERENT CHOICE OF FALSE
POSITIVES FOR FUSION IDS
FP TP Precision Recall Overall Accuracy F-score
50 58 0.54 0.31 0.99 0.39
100 93 0.48 0.49 0.99 0.49
200 122 0.38 0.64 0.99 0.48
500 135 0.21 0.71 0.99 0.32
the combination of PHAD and ALAD is shown in the Table
IV, V and VI for various values of false positive by setting
the threshold appropriately. The improved performance of the
combination of the alarms from each system can be observed
in Table VI, corresponding to the false positives between 100
and 200, by fixing the threshold bounds appropriately. Thus
the combination works best above a false positive of 100 and
much below a false positive of 200. The metric F-score reaches
a comparably better value of 0.49 for the fusion IDS from the
scores of 0.36 and 0.42 for PHAD and ALAD respectively.
The ROC curves of Figure 3 show the improved perfor-
mance of the Data-dependent Decision fusion IDS compared
to the two IDSs PHAD and ALAD. The Table VII shows the
result of P-test. The DD fusion method performs significantly
better than PHAD and comparable to ALAD according to the
significance test.
10−6 10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
FALSE POSITIVE RATE (LOG SCALE)
TR
UE
 P
O
SI
TI
VE
 R
AT
E
ROC SEMILOG CURVE
PHAD
ALAD
DD Fusion
Fig. 3. ROC curve of PHAD, ALAD and fusion IDS
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TABLE VII
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF INDIVIDUAL IDSS AND THE
DATA-DEPENDENT FUSION METHOD
Detector pairs/ DD Fusion DD Fusion
Z-number and PHAD and ALAD
ZR 3.17 1.6
ZP 1.33 0.61
V. CONCLUSION
The sensor fusion techniques works effectively by gather-
ing complementary information that can improve the overall
detection rate without adversely affecting the false alarm rate.
Simple theoretical model is initially illustrated in this paper
for the purpose of showing the improved performance of IDS
using sensor fusion. The detection rate and the false positive
rate quantify the performance benefit obtained through the
fixing of threshold bounds. The theoretical proof was sup-
plemented with an experimental evaluation, and the detection
rates, false positive rates, and F-score were measured. Also
the significance test (P test) was carried out for showing the
improved performance of sensor fusion in IDS. In order to
understand the importance of setting a threshold, the anomaly-
based IDSs, PHAD and ALAD have been individually ana-
lyzed. The experimental results obtained prove the correctness
of the theoretical analysis made in this work.
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